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Abstract 
The acceptance of income differences varies across countries. This article suggests belief in three narratives of 
modernity to account for this: the “tunnel effect”, related to perceptions of generational mobility; the “procedural 
justice effect”, related to the perceived fairness in the process of getting ahead; and the “middle-class effect”, 
related to perceptions of the social structure of society. The importance of the suggested narratives is tested by 
means of the ISSP 2009 module, which includes 38 countries. The finding is that belief in the three narratives 
can account for a considerable part of the cross-national variation. Beliefs in procedural justice and the existence 
of a middle class society clearly go together with high acceptance of current income differences. The “tunnel 
effect” is more complex. In general, belief in generational mobility goes together with acceptance of current 
income differences. But personal experience of such upward social mobility actually lower acceptance of current 
income differences, especially if overall generational mobility in society is believed to be backward. The 
framework explains most country-cases, which points to the existence of general patterns. But the models also 
indicate that the Philippines, and to a lesser extent the US and France, are special cases.  
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Introduction 
Economic inequality within countries has increased within the last three decades. The increased 
inequality in the US, UK and other OECD countries is well-documented (OECD, 2011; Piketty, 2014), 
and new data sources reveal it is a global phenomenon (e.g. Milanovic, 2011). The consequences of 
this development are widely discussed (e.g. Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010) and one of the central 
questions is how the masses will react. The classic Meltzer and Richard model suggests public 
discontent, the formation of social movements such as “Occupy Wall Street”, and potential revolutions 
(Meltzer and Richard, 1981), a fear that e.g. led China to withhold estimates of gini-coefficients when 
inequality surpassed the US level (Riskin, 2014). Many regime changes have indeed been rooted in 
economic inequalities, but there are as many exceptions to the rule (Haggard and Kaufman, 2012). That 
public discontent does not transform itself into regime changes can be given multiple explanations. 
More puzzling is the fact that one cannot even find a clear link between the level of inequality and 
public discontent. As a small prelude Figure 1 shows the level of income inequality (gini-coefficients) 
in the 38 countries from the 2009 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) on x-axis. At the one 
extreme we find equal countries such as e.g. Denmark (DK), Norway (NO) and Slovenia (SI). At the 
other we find unequal countries such as South Africa (ZA), Chile (CL) and Argentina (AR) (gini-
coefficients provided by OECD, Eurostat, World Bank). On the y-axis is shown the public acceptance 
of current income differences on a 0–100 scale. The index is based on the aggregation of responses to 
the following statement: “Income differences in UK are too high” [UK replaced with relevant country]. 
If a country scores 0, it means that every respondent in the country “agreed strongly” with the 
statement. If the country scores 100, it means that everybody “strongly disagreed” with the statement 
(“don’t know” answers were excluded).i Thus, a higher score means a higher (on average) acceptance 
of current income differences. In practice, most people in most countries tend to “agree” with the 
statement. This supports the proposition that few citizens are able to ignore income differences. But as 
demonstrated in Figure 1, there is 1) considerable variation between the countries and 2) no 
relationship between the actual income differences and the perception of current income differences 
being too high (in Figure 1, the correlation is as low as -0.04). National studies have also failed to 
establish any clear link between changes in level of inequality over time and changes in discontent 
(McCall and Kenworthy, 2009). This is a classic puzzle and has been the point of departure of much 
comparative empirical research (Janmaat, 2013). Why some publics tolerate income differences better 
than other publics is also the question this article sets out to explore.  
 
Figure 1: Actual income distribution (gini-coefficients) and acceptance of current income differences 
(lowest 0 – highest 100). 
  
  
Source: ISSP 2009. Gini-coefficients (OECD, Eurostat and World Bank).  
Country marks: Argentina (AR), Australia (AU), Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Chile 
(CL), China (CH), Taiwan (TW), Croatia (HR), Cyprus (CY), Czech R. (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia 
(EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (GE), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Israel (IL), Japan (JP), 
South Korea (KR), Latvia (LV), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO), Philippines (PH), Poland (PL), 
Portugal (PT), Russia (RU), Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SI), South Africa (ZA), Spain (ES), 
Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), Turkey (TR), Ukraine (UA), Great Britain (GB), United States (US).  
 
The article is divided into eight sections. The first section presents previous research and highlights the 
distinction between a cultural and modernist tradition. The second section pushes the research field 
forward by suggesting the importance of three narratives connected with modernity. The following 
sections test these propositions by means of the latest wave of ISSP data on social inequality. Section 
three introduces this data and the applied methods. Section four provides descriptive statistics, while 
section five provides effect sizes and significance tests. Section six elaborates on the complex effect 
from generational mobility while section seven discusses the limits of the suggested approach by 
studying the presence of deviant cases. Finally, section eight summarizes the findings and discusses the 
results.  
 
Cultural versus a modernist tradition to cross-national differences 
Following Janmaat’s review (2013), comparative studies of acceptance of economic inequality can be 
divided into a cultural and modernist tradition. In the former tradition, the absence of any clear link 
between the level of inequality and discontent with economic inequality has led researchers to highlight 
the presence of national peculiarities which make some publics more or less tolerant of economic 
inequality. The most dominant theme has been the presence or absence of American “exceptionalism” 
(Kelley and Evans, 1993; Lipset, 1997; Stolle and Rochon, 1999). Compared to the eleven other 
countries in the International Social Justice Survey fielded in 1991 (Kluegel and Miyano, 1995), the US 
did indeed stand out as an exceptional case. A number of follow-up studies based on ISSP data from 
1999 also continue to focus on American exceptionalism – but often with an argument that the US is 
not so exceptional (e.g. Osberg and Smeeding, 2006). As argued by Sachweh (2012), the sparse, 
primarily American and French, qualitative research has also focused on American exceptionalism, e.g. 
Lamont’s description of American workers making harsher judgments of the poor than French workers 
(2000). Another dominant theme has been whether the welfare regime as suggested by Esping-
Andersen (1990) influences – or at least correlates – with acceptance of income inequality. Svallfors 
(1997) and others (e.g. Kjærsgård, 2012) have provided evidence that, as measured by attitudes to wage 
differences alone, citizens of social democratic welfare regimes are the most egalitarian, while no clear 
distinction is found between liberal and conservative welfare regimes(e.g. Larsen, 2006). Such findings 
give leverage to the old idea of the presence of a passion of equality in the Nordic countries (Graubard, 
1986). A final example of the cultural approach is Whyte’s (2010) study of the Chinese’ acceptance of 
current income differences; a number of passages argue that the Chinese’ unique negative experience 
with Mao’s attempt to create total equality fosters acceptance of the current  income differences.  
The main shortcoming of the cultural approach is that it often fails to document that a given 
country really is unique. And this shortcoming becomes more and more evident as the number of 
countries available in international surveys increases.  The ISSP data from 2009 (see Figure 1) do 
indicate relative high acceptance of income differences in the US. But the acceptance is not extremely 
high. The Philippines (PH) has both higher economic inequality and a higher acceptance of current 
income differences.  One could also say that higher acceptance of income differences can be found in 
South Africa (ZA). The acceptance of current income differences in South Africa is lower than in the 
US, but its more extreme level of income differences should be taken into account. Thus, from simple 
summary statistics, one cannot conclude that the US is exceptional. The Nordic cultural uniqueness can 
also be questioned. As illustrated in Figure 1, there is actually an extraordinarily high acceptance of 
current income differences particularly in Denmark (DK) and Norway (NO) which have not been 
addressed in previous studies (often the focus has been on Sweden, where tolerance of income 
difference is lower). In fact, Norwegians and Danes have higher acceptance of current income 
differences than have Americans. This does not mean that Norwegians and Danes accept higher income 
differences than Americans in absolute terms. But even taking the actual income differences into 
account, Norway and Denmark are still among the countries with an extraordinary high acceptance of 
income differences. As for China, there are other developing countries such as Chile, Argentina, South 
Africa and the Philippines which without a cultural revolution have even higher acceptance of current 
income differences.  
In the modernist tradition, the absence of any clear link between the level of inequality and 
discontent with economic inequality is primarily a matter of countries being at different stages in the 
modernization process (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The basic argument is that acceptance of income 
differences will increase as free markets and democracy generate prosperity and justice. Empirically, 
the main focus has been whether acceptance of income differences in Eastern Europe has converged 
with that of Western Europe. As predicted by the modernist approach, the fall of communism was 
followed by higher acceptance of income differences (e.g. Gijsberts, 2002). However, the ISSP social 
inequality module from 1999 demonstrated that this was not a lasting effect; free markets and 
democracy were not a guarantee for acceptance of income inequality (see Janmaat, 2013, for an 
overview). And the same pattern can be found in the 2009 data. The lowest acceptance of current 
income differences in 2009 were found in Hungary (HU), the Ukraine (UA), Slovenia (SI) and the 
Slovak Republic (SK) (see Figure 1). Despite fairly low income differences – by comparative standards 
– the acceptance of the income differences is low. Slovenia for example has a level of income 
inequality (gini 0.24) around the level found in Denmark and Norway (gini 0.25), but comparatively 
many more of its citizens “agree” with the statement that current income differences are too high.  
The main shortcoming of the modernist approach is the deterministic effects assigned by it to 
free market economy and democracy. Maybe free markets and democracy do create more affluent and 
just societies, but in order to influence public opinion such qualities need to be perceived. And this is 
not a trivial process. Diagnosing the state of society is a cultural and political battlefield where the 
public are constantly exposed to positive and negative assessments that interact with their own 
experiences. Following this line of reasoning, this article focuses on the importance of public beliefs. 
More concretely, it suggests that belief in three narratives about modernity is pivotal to explaining 
cross-national differences in acceptance of income inequality. This could be seen as a middle-ground 
between the cultural tradition, which highlights national cultural peculiarities, and the modernist 
tradition, which highlights general patterns related to free markets and democracy.  
 
Three central narratives of modernity  
Using the term narrative, the article positions itself in the constructivist camp and shares its interest in 
how ordinary citizens make sense of and justify society (e.g. Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). The 
suggestion is that public beliefs in three narratives connected to free market economy and democracy is 
a fruitful way to understand the cross-national differences. In the American and French revolutions, and 
the liberalism and socialism that followed, one finds some of the most classic stories about modernity 
(sometimes labelled ‘master narrative’ by postmodernists). It is stories about progress, it is stories 
about justice and equality and it is stories about a less class divided society.  The aim of the article is to 
pinpoint some of the pivotal narratives and demonstrate how beliefs in these help to explain the cross-
national difference in acceptance of current income differences.      
The first suggested pivotal narrative of modernity is the idea of society being “on the move 
forwards”. This kind of optimism is found both in liberal and socialist thinking. It is well captured by 
the term “tunnel effect” suggested by Hirschman and Rothschild in their classic article of 1973 on 
tolerance towards income inequality in the course of economic development. Using the following 
analogy, they argue that acceptance of income inequality initially might be substantial: “suppose that I 
drive through a two-lane tunnel, both lances going in the same direction, and run into a serious traffic 
jam… I am in the left lane and feel dejected. After a while the cars in the right lane begin to move. 
Naturally, my spirits lift considerably, for I know that the jam has been broken and that my lane’s turn 
to move will surely come any moment now. Even though I still sit still, I feel much better off than 
before because of the expectation that I shall soon be on the move” (Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973). 
Thus, the argument is that people are able to tolerate income differences if they believe other people are 
on the move forward (upwards) and that they themselves or their close relatives (especially their 
children) will be able to do so in the future. The inspiration from the American case is obvious: an 
integral part of the “American dream” was that whole generations could become better and better off –  
including those at the bottom of society (Hochschild, 1995). It is also well-captured by the first part of 
the slogan “a rising tide lifts all boats” made famous by John F. Kennedy. This simple idea is well 
recognized in theoretical debates and has been included in both qualitative and quantitative research on 
the US case. But for unknown reasons comparative research has largely ignored this effect and the 
ISSP data contains no direct measure of degree of (perceived) overall mobility off society. However, 
the article suggests a proxy for the tunnel effect, which is distinct from (perceived) procedural justice 
and still more nuanced than simple growth rates (see below).  
 The second suggested pivotal narrative of modernity is that of procedural justice in the 
distribution of societal positions (Rawls, 1999). The narrative of procedural justice is easily spotted in 
the “American dream”, and in liberalism in general. The argument is that free markets make no 
differences; in contrast to unequal treatment at pre-modern markets controlled by the aristocracy. The 
narrative of procedural justice was also prominent in the French revolution; though with a stronger 
emphasis on the role of the state. In the Declaration of the Rights of Man of the citizen (1789) it is 
stated in article six that “[the law] must be the same for all, either that it protects, or that it punishes. All 
the citizens, being equal in its eyes, are equally admissible to all public dignities, places and 
employments, according to their capacity and without distinction other than that of their virtues and of 
their talents.” Especially, the Nordic countries are famous for having state institutions that provide this 
kind of (perceived) procedural justice (Rothstein, 1998). Using the analogies above one can say that  if 
everyone is “stuck” – or moves forward at the same pace as in the rising tide slogan – then procedural 
justice is high. The problem arises, to use again Hirschman and Rothschild’s example, when some cars 
move while others stand still. I might accept sitting in one place if I believe that the right to move is 
randomly assigned or follow another kind of procedural just logic. And, the other way around, I might 
become furious if particular cars (e.g. the fancy ones) are given special privileges to move. This effect 
has received the most attention in previous research (see Janmaat, 2013, for an overview) and the 
article uses the standard measures provided in the ISSP survey.  
 The third suggested pivotal narrative of modernity is the idea that a free market and a 
democratic state can create a less class divided society; often positively labelled a middle-class society. 
The strong preference for a middle-class society is also nicely captured by the narrative of the 
American dream. This narrative is filled with symbols of working-class citizens being able to attain a 
middle-class living standard, e.g. their own car, house in a suburban area and two children ( Fiske et al., 
2007; Larsen, 2013). And this dream is not particularly an American one. Throughout the world, and 
especially in the emerging economies, one often finds the same aspirations of creating a middle-class 
society (Gough and Therborn, 2010). This leads to the prediction that citizens are much more tolerant 
towards current income differences, if they think they live in a middle-class society. Lipset (1997) 
famously argued that socialism never got a foothold in the US because many Americans believed that 
the already lived in the classless society. As we shall see, this is also a key to understand the high 
tolerance in Denmark and Norway and the low tolerance reported for Eastern Europe: many 
Scandinavians believe that the middle-class utopia has been reached, while most Eastern Europeans are 
convinced it has not. In a fascinating – but so far little-explored – ISSP question, the public was asked 
what kind of society they preferred. The respondents were given five different options and the striking 
finding is that in all countries a majority prefer a society described as a “society with most people in the 
middle”. This kind of society is in all countries even preferred above a society described as “many 
people near the top, and only a few near the bottom”) (see Sachweh and Olafsdottir, 2010, for analysis 
of result from Sweden, US and Germany). The article makes use of a follow-up question where it is 
asked which of these five societies the respondent thinks he or she lives in.  
 
Data and method 
The ISSP from 2009 provides the most recent and comprehensive data for analyzing the public’s 
acceptance of income differences.
ii
 The main strength of the ISSP survey is that it includes many 
countries, which permits testing for the existence or absence of general patterns. As argued by Janmaat 
“…only research using a wide selection of countries, including both developed and developing ones, 
can properly assess which of the two theses [modernization or culture] has the upper hand in explaining 
cross-country differences in views of inequality” (2013:384). More specifically the key question of this 
article is to what extent the public’s beliefs in the three narratives are able to explain the cross-national 
acceptance of income inequality shown in Figure 1.  
 The first step is to operationalize the degree of public belief in the three suggested narratives. 
The “tunnel effect” is not directly measured in any comparative survey but a rough proxy has been 
constructed by means of two ISSP questions about position in society. The ISSP survey asked where 
the respondent would position themselves in society on a scale from 1 (“the bottom”, lowest position) 
to 10 (“the top”, highest). Thereafter they were asked to position, on the same scale, the family they 
grew up in. Their own (perceived) position minus the (perceived) position of the family they grew up in 
gives a very simple measure of (perceived) upward mobility on a scale from -9 (the unlikely situation 
where the respondent is now positioned at the very bottom, 1, but grew up in a family positioned at the 
very top, 10) to +9 (the opposite situation). This is naturally an individual-level phenomenon, which 
does not capture Hirschman & Rothschild’s “tunnel-effect” well. In their framework the important 
feature was not personal experience of mobility. The important feature was whether others cars have 
started to move. Therefore the article uses the  average of how all respondents within a given country 
responded to this question as a proxy for the belief in general upward (or downward) generational 
mobility. It is a disadvantage that this measure can only be applied at the aggregative level but it is a 
novel operationalization that has explanatory power. As we shall also see, this does not mean that 
personal experience of mobility does not matter. It does.  But depending on context such personal 
experiences can both increase and decrease acceptance of current income differences (see further 
elaboration in section six).  
The beliefs in the narrative of procedural justice were measured by five questions about what it 
takes to get ahead in the country’s society. In the models is used a summary measure of how much 
importance the respondents attributed to “coming from a wealthy family”, “having well-educated 
parents”, “knowing the right people”, “having political connections” and “giving bribes” on a scale 
from 0 to 100. A respondent scored 0 if he or she answered “essential for moving ahead” on all five 
questions. This would indicate the lowest possible level of (perceived) procedural justice. A respondent 
scored 100 if he or she answered “not important at all” on all five questions.iii  
The belief in the “middle-class” narrative was measured by a dummy variable indicating 
whether the respondent thought his or her society was a middle-class society (1) rather than one of four 
other described societies (0).
 iv
 This is also a novel operationalization, which has not been used before 
to account for tolerance of income differences. 
 The direction and impact of the variables were tested in linear multilevel regression 
models. Linear models are favored due to the easy interpretation of coefficients and the possibility to 
report amount of explained variations across levels and across countries. But all results have been 
confirmed by multi-level ordered logistic models (using the meologit procedure available in Stata 13; 
see online appendix
v
). The perceptions of procedural justice and of living in a middle-class society 
were treated as individual-level phenomena. The “tunnel-effect” variable is more complex.  On the 
individual level, it measured whether the individual has experienced a (perceived) move upward or 
downward. On the aggregated level, it is used to measure a feeling of general upward or downward 
generational mobility overall in society. Therefore generational mobility that is entered as a level-two 
variable. The models were controlled for background variables such as sex, age and education (level 
given on a five-point scale provided by ISSP). The models also include the respondents’ (perceived) 
current position in society, i.e. the 1–10 scale used in the mobility measure. The thesis is that those with 
higher position have a higher tolerance for current income differences. In models with education 
included (the other big determinant of relative position), this is largely a measure of income.
vi
 Finally, 
levels of inequality (gini-coefficients, around 2009), income (GDP per capita in US dollars, PPP 
standardized, 2009), recent economic growth (average grow rates in the decade prior to the interviews, 
1999–2009) and level of political rights in 2009 (provided by Freedom House on a 1–7 scale, best to 
worst) were added to the models. List-wise deletion of missing values was used. With this setup, the 
proposition of the importance of the three narratives was tested.  
 
Descriptive statistics  
Figure 2 shows the bivariate relationship between average perception of upward or downward 
generational mobility in the different societies and acceptance of current income differences (cor. 0.40). 
As already mentioned, China is at one extreme: On average, the Chinese indicate that their own 
position in society is one point higher than the position of the family they grew up in. Other societies 
with a feeling of generational upward mobility are Cyprus (0.8), Norway (0.6), Finland (0.6), Taiwan 
(0.6) and New Zealand (0.6). At the other end, one finds societies where the general feeling is that of 
backward  generational mobility. The extreme case is Ukraine, where the public indicate that their 
current position on average is 1.1 points lower than that of the family they grew up in. Other societies 
with a general sense of backward social mobility is Latvia (-0.7), Bulgaria (-0.7) and Hungary (-0.7). 
Among the less extreme cases, the US is the most interesting. The score of -0.3 indicates that the “old 
American feeling” of generational upward mobility is no longer present. On average, Americans feel 
they have a lower position than the position of the family they grew up in. As for more structural 
explanations, the feeling of generational mobility is linked to the level of GDP per capita (cor. 0.50), 
i.e. as one would expect long-term growth matters. Perceptions of generational mobility are, however, 
not significantly linked to recent growth (the last decade), level of income inequality or political rights.   
 
Figure 2: Bivariate correlation between average perceived generational mobility and acceptance of 
current income differences. 2009.  
 
 
Figure 3 shows the bivariate relationship between the average level of perceived procedural justice in 
getting ahead in society and acceptance of current income differences (corr. 0.55). At one end of the 
scale is Finland, where most people find “coming from a wealthy family”, “having well-educated 
parents”, “knowing the right people”, “having political connections” or “giving bribes” of little 
importance for getting ahead in society. Other countries with high level of perceived procedural justice 
Source: ISSP 2009 
Country marks: see Figure 1 
are New Zealand, Denmark, Japan and Great Britain. At the other end one finds China. Thus, the 
Chinese distinguish themselves by a combination of perceptions of high general upward generational 
mobility but very low levels of procedural justice in moving upward. Among other countries with low 
levels of perceived procedural justice are Ukraine, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia. 
Bivariate the measure of (perceived) procedural justice is positively linked to GDP (cor. 0.69) but 
negatively linked to recent economic growth (cor. 0.70). As expected, the belief in procedural justice is 
also significantly linked to political rights (0.49). The correlation with inequality level is negative but 
not strong enough to be significant (cor. -0.21).  
 
Figure 3: Bivariate correlation between perceived procedural justice (index) and acceptance of current 
income differences. 2009  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the bivariate relationship between share of the public answering that their country is the 
preferred middle-class society and acceptance of current income differences (corr. 0.64). As already 
mentioned, one finds here Denmark and Norway at one end of the scale – respectively 59 and 56 
percent of respondents indicate that their country is such a society. At the opposite end are Ukraine, 
Latvia, Bulgaria and Hungary, where below five percent think they live in such a society. Between 
Source: ISSP 2009  
Country marks: see Figure 1 
these extreme cases is the US, where 26 percent think they live in a middle-class society. This is a 
larger share than one might expect given the actual level of income inequality found in the country, 
which indicates that segments of Americans still believe in the American dream (especially those born 
before the 1970s, see Larsen 2013). Bivariate, the fulfillment of the middle-class utopia is strongly 
linked to GDP per capita (cor. 0.82), but again negatively linked to recent economic growth (cor. -
0.43). As expected, perceptions of living in a middle-class society are negatively linked to the level of 
income inequality (-0.37). There was also a negative correlation with political rights but it was not 
strong enough to be significant (cor. -0.29). 
 
Figure 4: Bivariate correlation between perception of living in a middle class society and acceptance of 
current income difference. 2009.  
 
 
 
 
As seen from the country rankings, the belief in these three narratives might interact. But they are not 
one-dimensional. At the aggregated level, perception of generational mobility is only moderately 
correlated with perceptions of procedural justice (cor. 0.36) and living in a middle-class society (cor. 
0.52). Perception of procedural justice and living in a middle-class society is stronger correlated (0.69) 
Source: ISSP 2009  
Country marks: see Figure 1 
but still not a one-to-one relationship. Thus, one can indeed find societies such as China, where the 
feeling of generational mobility is high, while the feeling of procedural justice is low; and societies 
such as Japan, where the feeling of procedural justice is high, while the feeling of living in a middle-
class society is relatively low. Therefore these three variables will be treated separately in the 
multivariate analyses (see online appendix for summary measures of all included variables).  
 
Directions, effect sizes and significance tests  
The main steps in the conducted multilevel regression models are seen in Table 1. The first model (the 
so-called empty model) indicates how much of the variance in acceptance of income difference one 
finds, respectively, between countries (14 percent) (73.4 divided by total variance, 73.4 plus 445.3) and 
between individuals (86 percent). The size of the former figure indicates that we are indeed in need of a 
multilevel model in order not to miscalculate standard errors (Hox, 2010). The next model (II) includes 
significant structural variables. Among the aggregated structural variables, only GDP per capita had a 
significant effect. An increase in GDP per capita of 1000 US dollars goes together with an increase in 
acceptance of current income different of 0.18 point on the scale from 0 to 100.  There were no 
significant relationships between the measure for political rights, the level of income inequality, recent 
growth and acceptance of income differences (therefore not included in the models). Especially, the 
absence of a correlation with political rights, as provided by Freedom House, is a problem for the 
modernist account. Among the individual level structural variables Model II shows that females in 
general are less tolerant of current income differences than males (-1.35), that the elderly are in general 
less tolerant than younger (-0.04), that the more highly educated (0.28) and those in higher positions 
(1.50) are in general more tolerant than the less educated and those in lower positions.  
The variance figures indicate that by taking the significant structural factors into account, the 
model is able to explain 29 percent of the between country variation in acceptance of current income 
inequality ((74.1-52.0) /73.4, see variance measures). Whether this is high or low is a matter of 
interpretation. Those who adhere to a modernist account would emphasis that a few variables actually 
help to explain cross-national differences. Those who adhere to a cultural account would emphasis that 
71 percent of the country variation is left unexplained.  
 
 
 Table 1 Association between perceptions of social mobility, procedural justice, societal structure and 
acceptance of current income differences. Multilevel linear regression: Random Intercept 
Models (I–IV) and random slope model (V-VI). Regression coefficients for fixed effects 
(including standard errors and levels of significance) and variance estimates for random 
effects. Ncountries = 38. 
 Model 
I 
Empty 
model 
Model II 
Structural 
variables 
Model III 
+ beliefs 
in three 
narratives 
Model IV 
+ 
decompos
ition of 
mobility 
Model V 
+ 
Random 
slope 
(upward) 
Model VI 
+ Interact-
ion 
Fixed effects
A
:       
- GDP per capita (1000 US)  0.18** 
(0.06) 
0.09
ns 
(0.07) 
0.09
ns 
(0.07) 
0.07
ns 
(0.07) 
0.06
ns 
(0.07) 
- Sex (0 /1 female)  -1.35*** 
(0.18) 
-1.52*** 
(0.19) 
-1.53*** 
(0.19) 
-1.52*** 
(0.19) 
-1.52*** 
(0.19) 
- Age  -0.04*** 
(0.005) 
-0.04*** 
(0.005) 
-0.04*** 
(0.006) 
-0.04*** 
(0.006) 
-0.04*** 
(0.006) 
- Education (1-5)  0.28*** 
(0.07) 
0.21** 
(0.07) 
0.22** 
(0.07) 
0.22** 
(0.07) 
0.21** 
(0.07) 
- Current position (1-10) 
 
 
1.50*** 
(0.06) 
1.35*** 
(0.06) 
1.39*** 
(0.06) 
1.39*** 
(0.06) 
1.40*** 
(0.06) 
- Average mobility in 
society (-9 to 9)  
 - 2.85
ns 
(2.76) 
2.94
ns 
(2.75) 
2.29
ns 
(2.69) 
2.95
ns 
(2.70) 
- Perception of living in 
middle-class society (1/0) 
 - 6.24*** 
(0.27) 
6.21*** 
(0.28) 
6.19*** 
(0.27) 
6.19*** 
(0.27) 
- Procedural justice (0-100) 
 
 - 0.07*** 
(0.005) 
0.07*** 
(0.005) 
0.07*** 
(0.005) 
0.07*** 
(0.005) 
    -Upward mobility (0/1)  - - -0.97*** 
(0.22) 
-0.93** 
(0.34) 
-0.96** 
(0.32) 
- Same position  - - Ref Ref Ref 
- Downward mobility (0/1)  - - -0.48* 
(0.24) 
0.52* 
(0.27) 
-0.54* 
(0.25) 
- Interaction: Upward 
mobility x average social 
mobility in society 
 
 - - - - 1.69** 
(0.67) 
- Intercept 
 
19.8*** 
(1.39) 
20.2*** 
(1.18) 
19.3*** 
(1.12) 
19.7*** 
(1.12) 
19.8*** 
(1.11) 
19.8*** 
(1.10) 
Table 1 (continued) 
Random effects. 
Variance estimates: 
      
- Country level 73.4 52.0 46.0 45.7 44.1 44.0 
- Individual level 445.3 435.6 429.7 429.6 429.1 429.1 
- Upward mobility     2.3 1.8 
- Covariance: upward 
mobility × intercept 
    2.0 1.8 
Nindividuals 52,024 50,968 49,796 49,796 49,796 49,796 
NS) p ≥ .05; *) p < .05; **) p < .01; ***) p < .001 
A
 All independent variables centered around the grand mean.  
 
Model III included belief in the three suggested narratives.  As expected, beliefs in these stories about 
modernity lower the effect from structural variables such as GDP per capita and education; the effect 
from the former is reduced to 0.09 and turns insignificant. Our interpretation is that these beliefs are 
indeed intermediate variables between structural changes caused by free market and democracy and 
acceptance of income differences, i.e. modernization processes do indeed need to be perceived. 
Furthermore, the explained part of the between country variance increases to 37 percent (73.4-
46)/73.4). This leads to the overall conclusion that the three narratives indeed are important for 
explaining cross-national differences in acceptance of income differences.  
Turning to the coefficients the model shows that belief in procedural justice is clearly correlated 
with acceptance of current income inequalities: for every step upwards on the scale of 0–100, tolerance 
of current income differences is estimated to increase by 0.07 points. So going from one extreme to the 
other in the perception of procedural justice will increase income tolerance by approximately 7 points. 
This is a well-known finding. The perception of living in a middle class society also goes together with 
high acceptance of income differences. If the respondent thinks he or she lives in a middle-class 
society, the acceptance of current income differences is estimated to increase by 6.24 points. The effect 
from living in a society with a general belief in upward generational mobility is less straight-forward. 
In model III an average (perceived) generational mobility increase of one point (as in China) is 
estimated to increase acceptance of current income differences with 2.85 points. But the effect is not 
significant. One should, however, with only 38 cases at level two be cautious with dismissing the effect 
due to significance levels. If GDP per capita is left out of the equation, the “tunnel-effect” variable does 
have a strong (4.7) and significant effect. And in an ordered logistic model, the effect is highly 
significant even with GDP included (see online appendix model III). Finally, as will be demonstrated 
below, one should further model contingent effects in order to understand the impact from generational 
mobility.  
  
The complex impact from generational mobility  
Model IV to VI  decompose the effect from respondents’ personal experience of upward or downward 
social mobility. Here one can distinguish between the effect from being in a new position in society 
(lower or higher) and the effect from the very experience of moving upward or downward. A person’s 
position in society clearly influences tolerance for current income differences. This effect is measured 
by respondents’ self-positioning (on a 1–10 scale). It is estimated in model IV that someone self-
positioned one step higher on this scale has a 1.39-point higher tolerance for current income 
differences. Thus a person located at the very top (10) is estimated to score 12.5 points higher on the 0–
100 scale for income-difference-tolerance than a person located at the very bottom (1) (9 steps times 
1.39). However, the very experience of social mobility – if the income-difference-tolerance of 
respondents’ current position is controlled for – has a different effect. Model VI indicates that the 
experience of upward mobility (of any range, i.e. measured by a dummy) decreases the tolerance for 
current income differences by 0.97 points – not a very strong effect, but clearly significant. The 
experience of downward mobility – again with the effect from current position controlled for – also has 
a negative effect, though not as strong (-0.48). But these effects should be further elaborated.   
The next two models show how the effect from the experience of upward mobility is different 
in various countries. In model V, the effect from upward mobility is allowed to vary across countries. 
The variance measures indicate that the experience of upward mobility indeed has a different effect 
across countries (model V tested significantly better than model IV, maximum likelihood test). The 
next question is how to account for this different effect. Model VI demonstrates a significant 
interaction effect between the average (perceived) generational mobility in society and the individual 
experience of upward mobility. In societies with an average upward (perceived) mobility, a personal 
experience of upward mobility increases tolerance for current income differences. To use the analogy, 
the experience of driving forward, when others also are perceived to be on the move, makes me happy 
about the traffic situation. This is a “virtuous” circle from which China currently benefits. But in 
countries with an average (perceived) downward mobility, the experience of upward mobility has the 
opposite effect. If someone moves forward while the rest of society moves backwards, tolerance for 
current income differences actually tends to decrease among those who move forward. This is part of 
the “vicious” circle in which countries such as Ukraine and Hungary find themselves.vii The  result are 
confirmed by ordered logistic regressions (see online appendix models IV to VI).  
Limits of the three narratives - deviant cases  
From a modernist approach one could emphasize the fact that we have been able to explain a 
considerable part of the cross-national variation by means of a few variables connected to modernity; 
or at least perceptions of modernity. However, from a cultural approach one could point to the fact that 
still above 50 percent of cross-national variation is left unexplained. A fruitful way to bridge this 
discussion is to use general models to look for exceptional cases. In Figure 5 this is done by showing 
the residuals from the empty model and model IV respectively. The countries are ranked according to 
how far the actual tolerance of income differences is from the one predicted by model IV.  
Figure 5: Residuals (level two) from empty model and model IV. Multilevel regressions (see text). 
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The differences between the residuals of the empty model and model VI reveal that variations in belief 
in generational mobility, procedural justice and the presence or absence of middle-class society, plus a 
number of standard background variables do a good job explaining cross-national differences. With 
these few variables taken into account, the low level of income tolerance in the Ukraine, Hungary, 
Russia, Latvia, Croatia and Bulgaria is well explained. The same is true for the high tolerance in 
Norway, Denmark, New Zealand and Cyprus. South Africa and even China are also fairly well 
predicted by the model. However, the Philippines remain a truly exceptional case. In fact, when belief 
in generational mobility, procedural justice and middle class society are taken into account, the high 
income-difference tolerance found in the Philippines becomes even more exceptional (in technical 
terms, the residuals in model IV are larger than the residuals in the empty model; see Figure 5). If one 
accepts that a country can be truly exceptional in terms of income-difference-tolerance, it makes sense 
to simply leave the Philippines out of the statistical models (which in technical terms also eliminates 
the effect that strong outliers can have on regression models). Reruns of the models indicate that the 
expected patterns are indeed strengthen when the Philippines are left out. Model IV without the 
Philippines is able to explain 67 percent of the variance between countries.
viii
 However, even if one 
excludes the Philippines and only looks at the 37 other cases, there are still some countries that are 
more difficult to explain than others. The countries with “too high” levels of tolerance of current 
income differences are the US, Cyprus and New Zealand. The model does help to explain high level of 
tolerance (the residuals in model IV are lower than those in the empty model; see Figure 5) but the 
model do not tell the full story. Thus, the US is indeed somewhat exceptional. Among the countries 
with “too low” income-difference tolerance, France stands out as the most exceptional case. Despite 
belief in upward generational mobility and procedural justice, the French indicate little acceptance of 
current income differences. Thus, there is indeed a world of difference between the US and France, 
which is confirmed in qualitative interviews (Lamont and Thévenot, 2000; Lamont, 2000).  
  
Conclusion 
The article finds support for the argument that beliefs are important for explaining cross-national 
differences in acceptance of current income differences. The overall point is that cross-national 
differences in acceptance of income differences are not a matter of preferences, whether rooted in self-
interest/perceived self-interest (the point of departure for much economic research in this field) or 
historical embedded values (the point of departure for what above was labelled the cultural approach). 
Instead the article argues that it is a matter of belief in narratives of modernity that can be tracked all 
the way back to the American and French revolution.  
The emphasis put on beliefs is not a new position in the literature (see e.g. Bénabou and Tirole, 
2006). However, by means of ISSP data with more cases, new operationalizations and multilevel 
regression technics, the article has contributed by specifying the importance of three pivotal narratives 
connected to modernity. The article also demonstrated that at the individual level, the effect from 
generational mobility was complex. Persons positioned higher in society have in general greater 
acceptance of income differences. But the very experience of upward social mobility normally lowers 
the tolerance for current income differences. This is particularly the case in countries where the general 
trend is (perceived) downward generational mobility. In contrast, upward personal mobility increases 
the acceptance of income differences in societies which are perceived to be generally on the move 
forward. This is a novel interaction-effect, which has not been addressed by previous research, and 
points to the fact that the effects of individual levels variables differ across contexts.   
 These findings do not imply that national cultures are of no importance. At the country level the 
models did indicate the presence of “difficult” or exceptional cases. The Philippines is a truly unique 
case, which calls for other studies. France and the US were also somewhat exceptional cases, the 
former being less tolerant, and the latter being more tolerant, than expected by the model. Therefore the 
previous research on these two countries is clearly relevant. But these studies run the risk of 
exaggerating the differences across countries in general – and between Europe and the US in particular. 
Furthermore, even the differences between France and the US can be interpreted as variations across 
more fundamental belief or disbelief in the narrative of modernity; the Americans being the optimists 
and the French being the pessimists.  
Nor do the findings imply that the structural process of modernization is without importance. 
On the contrary, the three suggested narratives are directly linked to ideas about the functioning of free 
markets and democracy. But it is not a deterministic relationship. In the sample, no relationships were 
found between political rights, recent growth and acceptance of current income differences. Therefore 
it is not so surprising that countries with free markets and democracies can experience a backlash in 
tolerance of income differences; as it has been the case in Eastern Europe. Free markets and democracy 
do not automatically generate legitimacy.  
 Finally, one can speculate about the consequences of the rising inequality in income.  Based on 
the conclusions of the article it is logically to conclude that neither this development does automatically 
cause public discontent. Instead the central question is whether the public starts to question the 
narratives about free markets and democracies being able to secure generational mobility, procedural 
justice and a middle-class society. One can indeed observe that these narratives of modernity are up for 
discussion, partly caused by social scientists delivering statistics about backward generational mobility 
(e.g. Murray, 2012), unequal chances for social upward mobility (e.g. Corak, 2005) and the presence of 
a new precariat and an extremely rich upper class (e.g. Piketty, 2014). Hirschman and Rothschild had 
the same fear in the 1970s: “Providential and tremendously helpful as the tunnel effect is … (because it 
accommodates the inequalities almost inevitably arising in the course of development), it is also 
treacherous: … rulers are not necessarily given any advance notice about its decay and exhaustion, … 
on the contrary, they are lulled into complacency by the easy early stage when everybody seems to be 
enjoying the very process that will later be vehemently denounced and damned as…consisting 
essentially in ‘the rich becoming richer’” (1973:552). 
  
End notes
                                                          
i
 Index construction: “agreed strongly”= 0, “agree” =1, “neither agree nor disagree”= 2, “disagree” =3 
and “disagree strongly” = 4. This index from 0 to 4 is multiplied by 25, creating an index from 0 to 
100, in order to make the interpretation easier in figures and models. See online appendix for ordered 
logic regression using the ordinal scale as dependent variable.  
ii
 All available countries were included. The Belgian sample includes only the Flemish-speaking 
region. Data is unweighted.   
iii
 The five items form a fairly uniform scale. Factor analysis indicates a first factor with eigenvalue at 
2.422 and a second factor with eigenvalue below 1. Crombach alfa is also above 0.60 in all countries 
but Argentina and Cyprus. I constructed a simple additive index in order to make the interpretation 
easier (“not important at all”=0, “not very important” =2, “”fairly important” = 3, “very important” = 4, 
“essential” = 5; multiple by 20, creating an index from 0 to 100, to make easier the interpretation). 
Those answering “don’t know” were coded into the middle category “fairly important” (2) in order not 
to lose too many cases.   
iv
 These were (A) “A small elite at the top, very few people in the middle and the great mass of people 
at the bottom”, (B) “A society like a pyramid with a small elite at the top, more people in the middle, 
and most at the bottom”, (C) “A pyramid, except that just a few people are at the bottom” and (E) 
“Many people near the top, and only a few near the bottom.” The descriptions were also followed by 
small charts (see ISSP documentation).  
v
 http://vbn.aau.dk/da/publications/how-three-narratives-of-modernity-justify-economic-
inequality(beea5501-d199-46d6-9cfc-1944de3b31fd).html 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
vi Self-reported position was used, as it is more easily handled in cross-national datasets. Actual income 
is impossible to compare in the ISSP data as many respondents have not stated their income and 
furthermore the ISSP program has not standardized income categories. 
vii Interactions between average mobility and perceptions of living in middle-class society and 
procedural justice were also tested (not shown). There were no significant effects: Perceptions of living 
in a middle-class society and of procedural justice matter independently of the experience of being on 
the move backward or forward. However, if the Philippines are left out of the sample (see section 
seven), there is a positive interaction effect between perceived generational mobility and procedural 
justice. This suggests that the importance of procedural justice in getting ahead increases a little when 
societies are on the “move forward”, and is of less importance when they are “stuck”, which is what 
one could expect. 
viii
 At the same time the coefficient for average generational mobility increases to 3.7 with and 
acceptable p-value at 0.06 (GDP included in the model).  
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 Online appendix:  
Table A1: Summary of statistics for variables used in multi-level regressions  
 Min Max Mean St. 
devia-
tion 
n 
Dependent variable:      
Acceptance of income difference  
(rescaled 0–100, see endnote 1) 
0 100 19.2 22.7 52,024 
Independent variables at individual level:      
Generational mobility (perceived). Scaled from -9 to 9  
(see method section for operationalization) 
-9 9 0.17 1.86 52,102 
Index for perceived procedural justice. Rescaled 0–100  
(see method section and endnote 2) 
0 100 53.4 19.1 52,210 
Perception of living in a middle-class society (dummy 
1=middle-class type society, 0=others) 
0 1 0.17 0.38 52,541 
Independent variables at aggregated level:      
Generational mobility (perceived). Scaled from -9 to 9  
(see method section for operationalization) 
-1.05 1.05 0.15 0.47 38 
Control variables and the individual level:      
Sex (dummy 1=female, 0=male) 0 1 0.55 0.50 53,124 
Age  15 97 46.8 17.1 53045 
Education (in five ISSP standard brackets, 0 (no formal) to 
5 (highest university), see ISSP documentation) 
0 5 2.83 1.46 52,789 
Position in society 1–10 (self-reported) 1 10 5.00 1.82 52,348 
Control variables at aggregated level:       
Gini-coefficient (closest at 2009).  0.24 0.70 0.33 0.09 38 
GDP per capita 2009 (USS)  1,832 78,457 26,588 18,781 38 
Average annual growth rate 1999-2009 0.55 10.3 3.16 1.77 38 
Political rights (Freedom house) 1 7 1.82 1.65 38 
 
 Table A2 Association between perceptions of social mobility, procedural justice, societal structure and 
acceptance of current income differences. Multilevel ordered logistic regression (Stata 
meologit procedure): Random Intercept Models (I–IV) and random slope model (V-VI). 
Coefficients for fixed effects including standard errors and levels of significance). Ncountries = 
38. 
 Model II 
Structural 
variables 
Model III 
+ beliefs in 
three 
narratives 
Model IV + 
decomposit
ion of 
mobility 
Model V 
+ 
Random 
slope 
(upward) 
Model VI 
+ Interact-
ion 
Fixed effects
A
:      
- GDP per capita (1000 US) 0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.03*** 
(0.00) 
0.03*** 
(0.00) 
-0.03*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
- Sex (0 /1 female) -0.10*** 
(0.02) 
-0.12*** 
(0.02) 
-0.12*** 
(0.02) 
-0.12*** 
(0.02) 
-0.12*** 
(0.02) 
- Age -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
- Education (1-5) 0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.01
ns
 
(0.01) 
- Current position (1-10) 
 
0.15*** 
(0.01) 
0.13*** 
(0.01) 
0.13*** 
(0.01) 
0.14*** 
(0.01) 
0.14*** 
(0.01) 
- Average mobility in 
society (-9 to 9)  
- 0.22***
 
(0.02) 
0.23***
 
(0.02) 
0.28***
 
(0.02) 
0.32***
 
(0.03) 
- Perception of living in 
middle-class society (1/0) 
- 0.52*** 
(0.02) 
0.52*** 
(0.02) 
0.52*** 
(0.02) 
0.53*** 
(0.02) 
- Procedural justice (0-100) 
 
- 0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
    -Upward mobility (0/1) - - -0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.04
ns
 
(0.03) 
- Same position - - Ref Ref Ref 
- Downward mobility (0/1) - - -0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
- Interaction: Upward 
mobility x average social 
mobility in society 
 
- - - - 0.28** 
(0.06) 
 
Nindividuals 50,968 49,796 49,796 49,796 49,796 
NS) p ≥ .05; *) p < .05; **) p < .01; ***) p < .001 
A
 All independent variables centered around the grand mean.  
